The IIAR project is building econometric models for economic incentives for Internet mail providers to do better about preventing and dealing with spam and botnets. This work involves game theoretic models and other formal mathematical models, together with statistical analysis and extensive empirical analysis of the Internet primarily based on anti-spam blocklists. A prototype reputation system for mail providers and and for blocklists is projected among the results of the project. The project operates out of the Center for Research in Electronic Commerce at the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin. We've launched our public
The IIAR Project is funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation, NSF Award #0831338, CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Incentives, Insurance and Audited Reputation: An Economic Approach to Controlling Spam. |  |
Participants
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Publications
"Incentive Mechanisms for Internet Security", by Manoj Parameswaran and Andrew Whinston, in Collection: Rao and Upadhyaya, "Handbook of Information Security, Handbooks in Information Systems Vol.4", Elsevier Publications, (2009).
Managing Interdependent Information Security Risks: A Study of Cyberinsurance, Managed "Security Service and Risk Pooling," presented at leading conference on Information Systems (ICIS 2009), Zhao, Xue, and Whinston (2009).
Verizon Port 587 Requirement: Effects on Anti-Spam Blocklists, by John S. Quarterman, Markus Sammallahti, Huaxia Rui, and Andrew B. Whinston, CREC Technical Report, July 2009.
Autonomous System Blocklisting Effects of Triple Fiber Network Shutdown, by John S. Quarterman, Markus Sammallahti, Huaxia Rui, and Andrew B. Whinston, CREC Technical Report, July 2009.
FireEye's Ozdok Botnet Takedown In Spam Blocklists and Volume Observed by IIAR Project, CREC, UT Austin, by John S. Quarterman and Prof. Andrew Whinston, NANOG 48, Austin, Texas, 24 Feb 2010.
Economic Incentives for Cooperation to Fight Spam, by John S. Quarterman, at RIPE Labs, 6 July 2010
A Game Theoretic Model and Empirical Analysis of Spammer Strategies, by Manoj Parameswaran, Huaxia Rui, and Serpil Sayin, CEAS 2010, Redmond, WA, 13-14 July 2010.
Spam Reputation as Output Measure of Infosec, by John S. Quarterman, Serpil Sayin, Manoj Parameswaran, Jouni Reinikainen, Andrew B. Whinston, at Metricon 5.0, 10 August 2010, Washington, DC.
Data, Reputation, and Certification Against Spam, by John S. Quarterman, Serpil Sayin, Jouni Reinikainen, Eshwaran Vijaya Kumar, Andrew B. Whinston, at DDCSW, Internet2, 17-18 August 2010, WUSTL, St. Louis, MO
Economic Incentives for Internet Security through Reputation and Insurance, by John S. Quarterman and Andrew B. Whinston, a position paper for the invitation-only first APWG and IEEE-SA Roadmapping Session, Toward a Global Public Health Initiative Model for eCrime Response, organized by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) andthe IEEE Standards Association at SMU, Dallas, Texas, 20 October 2010.
Internet Cloud Layers for Economic Incentives for Internet Security, by John S. Quarterman, Andrew B. Whinston PI, Serpil Sayin, Eshwaran Vijaya Kumar, Jouni Reinikainen, Joni Ahlroth, at RIPE Labs, 29 October 2010.
Internet Reputation Experiments for Better Security, by John S. Quarterman, Andrew B. Whinston, Serpil Sayin, Eshwaran Vijaya Kumar, Jouni Reinikainen, and Joni Ahlroth, at RIPE Labs, 8 November 2010.
Analysis of Spamming Behavior at Different Aggregation Levels and Implications for IT Security by Serpil Sayin, Koc University, Manoj Parameswaran, Santa Clara University, John S. Quarterman, Quarterman Creations, Andrew B. Whinston, U. Texas at Austin INFORMS 2010, Austin, Texas, 10 November 2010.
Transparency as Incentive for Internet Security: Organizational Layers for Reputation by John S. Quarterman, Quarterman Creations, Andrew B. Whinston, U. Texas at Austin, Serpil Sayin, Koç University, E. Vijaya Kumar, J. Reinikainen, J. Ahlroth, IIAR Project, at RIPE 61, Rome, Italy, 15 November 2010.
Economic mechanism to manage operational security risks for inter-organizational information systems. by F. Fang, M. Parameswaran, X. Zhao, and A.B. Whinston. In DSI 2011. Decision Sciences Institute, 19-22 November 2011.
Experimenting with Reputation and Insurance as Economic Incentives for Internet Security, by John S. Quarterman, Andrew B. Whinston, Serpil Sayin, an extended position paper for the first APWG and IEEE-SA Roadmapping Session, Toward a Global Public Health Initiative Model for eCrime Response, published by the IEEE Standards Association in their invitation-only Stop-Ecrime working group, 25 December 2010.
ASN Ranking Correlations Between Spam Blocklists, by John S. Quarterman, Andrew B. Whinston, Serpil Sayin, Eshwaran Vijaya Kumar, Jouni Reinikainen, and Joni Ahlroth, at RIPE Labs, 23 December 2010.
See also the IIAR topic in John S. Quarterman's Perilocity blog, http://riskman.typepad.com/perilocity/iiar/.
Acknowledgements and Disclaimer
NSF
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0831338.Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
